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NON-SALARY PROVISIONS IN NEGOTIATED TEACHER
AGREEMENTS: DELEGATION AND THE ILLINOIS
CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE VII, SECTION 10
INTRODUCTION
During the past decade numerous bills have been proposed in the Illi-
nois legislature which would give statutory approval to public employee
bargaining.' Although the passage of such a statute would be the begin-
ning of the analysis of the scope of collective bargaining agreements, it
should not be the only consideration. Prior case law, statutes, and consti-
tutional provisions are relevant, as is a discussion of the legal theories re-
lating to the delegation of school board authority.
The development of the law relating to negotiated teacher agreements
has proceeded on a case-by-case basis in Illinois since 1966 when Chicago
Division of the Illinois Education Association v. Board of Education2 first
recognized the legality of teacher negotations. The litigation that followed
has resulted in limiting the negotiated agreements by employing the doc-
trine that school boards may not delegate their authority. The end result
has been confusion with respect to what a school board is allowed to bar-
gain away.
Writers, who have examined the nature of teacher negotiations as they
have developed in the nation3 and in Illinois, 4 have recognized that the
delegation doctrine has been used as a significant limitation upon the va-
lidity of negotiated agreements. However, the literature is surprisingly
1. During the past decade there has been continuing agitation for public school
employee collective bargaining. For a comprehensive list of bills see Fletcher, Illi-
nois Public School Employee's Right to Strike-Constitutional Considerations, 24
DEPAUL L. REV. 532 n. 7 (1975).
2. 76 Ill. App. 2d 456, 222 N.E.2d 243 (1st Dist. 1966).
3. Edwards, The Developing Labor Relations Law in the Public Sector, 10 DuQ.
L. REV. 357 (1972); Edwards, The Emerging Duty to Bargain in the Public Sector,
71 MICH. L. REv. 885 (1973); Wellington & Winter, Structuring Collective Bargain-
ing in Public Employment, 79 YALE L.J. 805 (1970).
4. Clark, Public Employee Labor Legislation: A Study of the Unsuccessful At-
tempts to Enact a Public Employee Bargaining Statute in Illinois, 20 LAn. L.J. 164
(1969); Miller, The Alice-in-Wonderland World of Public Employee Bargaining, 50
Cm. B. Rac. 223 (1969); Comment, Teacher Negotiations in Illinois: Current Status
and Proposed Reforms, 23 U. ILL. L.F. 307 (1973).
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devoid of a technical discussion of the legal theories relating to this doctrine.
By way of contrast, this Comment will review the two major theories
of delegation. The first is a statutory limitation founded in the concept
that a unit of local government may not delegate authority without stat-
utory permission. The second is purely a judicial limitation, not depend-
ent upon statutory authorization, which disallows delegations that are not
accompanied by adequate standards. It should be noted that because the
two theories of delegation are delineated in treatises relating to municipal
corporations, their application to school districts will be made by analogy
where precise precedents are not available. 5
This discussion will be followed by an examination of article VII, sec-
tion 10 of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, which significantly altered the
traditional limitations on school boards to delegate authority. Finally, a
case-by-case analysis of Illinois decisions involving school board delegation
will be made using the theoretical background provided by the treatises.
LEGAL THEORIES OF DELEGATION
Traditionally, school boards delegate their authority by way of negoti-
ated agreements in two ways. First, when the board enters into a nego-
tiated agreement, the result is a bilateral determination of how the school
system will operate. To the extent that the teacher organization is suc-
cessful in the negotiations, there is a delegation of authority.6 Second,
when an arbitrator is appointed, as prescribed by a contractual provision
of the agreement, it is the arbitrator, and not the school board who will
make the policy decisions according to the agreement. 7 In a narrow sense,
5. In Illinois, school boards have been defined as:
bodies corporate with independent legal existence .... Where there are
neither local statutes nor precedents on points involving school boards or
districts, cases involving the more traditional municipalities can customarily
be used analogically with considerable assurance.
3A C. ANTIEAU, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW, INDEPENDENT LOCAL GOVERNMENT
ENTITIES §§ 30C.00, 30C.01 (1970) [hereinafter cited as ANTIEAU].
6. See generally D. MYERS, TEACHER POWER-PROFESSIONAL AND COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING 90 (1973); W. MILLER & N. NEWBURY, TEACHER NEGOTIATIONS: A
GUIDE FOR BARGAINING TEAMS (1970). For examples and statistics relating to par-
ticular non-salary provisions see 7-8 NAT'L EDUC. ASS'N, NEGOTIATIONS RESEARCH DI-
GEST (1974-75). See also In re Fort Wayne Community Schools, 61 Lab. Arb. 1159(1973) where an arbitrator found the school board to have breached the negotiated
agreement by failing to give full support to teachers on matters of student discipline;
In re Rockford Bd. of Educ. & Rockford Educ. Ass'n, 57 Lab. Arb. 1213 (1971)
where arbitrator found that board did not breach the agreement which required the
board to hire staff with bachelor's degrees.
7. Wellington & Winter, Structuring Collective Bargaining in Public Employ-
ment, 79 YALE L.J. 805, 834 (1970). See also text accompanying note 17 infra.
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delegation may be considered to occur only in this latter instance where
the school board is not even bilaterally involved in the exercise of its au-
thority.8
The interpretation of the non-salary provisions will determine the ex-
tent to which the school board will retain unilateral control over the vari-
ous aspects of school policy and, conversely, will determine the degree to
which teachers will have control over the conditions of their employment. 9
It is often said that these determinations are for the legislature, but it
is not probable that -the legislature can provide a definitive answer as to
what authority a school board may bargain away. Experience in states
that have public employee bargaining statutes has demonstrated that in
the final analysis it is the courts that must determine who is the appropri-
ate decision-maker in relation to particular school policy items. 10 Courts,
however, are in the position of being able to balance the competing inter-
ests and determine which of these items should be decided by the school
board alone, which ones should be made by the board and the teacher
organization, and which ones may include the board, the teacher organiza-
tion, and an arbitrator. They usually proceed on a case-by-case basis by
'balancing the interest of the teachers against those of the public represented
by the school board." As Professors Hart and Sacks have said:
Problems arising in a court call for a perceptive awareness not only of what
courts are for but of what the legislature is for and sometimes also of what
8. The fact that the municipality engages in collective bargaining does not
necessarily mean that it has surrendered its decision-making authority with
respect to public employment. The final decision as to what terms and con-
ditions of employment the municipality will agree to, or whether it will
agree at all, still rests solely with its legislative body.
Fellows v. LaTronica, 151 Colo. 300, 307, 377 P.2d 547, 551 (1962) (concurring
opinion).
9. W. MILLER & N. NEWBURY, TEACHER NEGOTIATIONS: A GUIDE FOR BAR-
GAINING TEAMS 39-178 (1970).
10. For an examination of the ways courts approach public employee bargaining
statutes, see Note, Determining the Scope of Bargaining Under the Indiana Educa-
tion Employment Relations Act, 49 IND. L.J. 460 (1974).
11. New Jersey is a particularly good example of where the scope of bargaining
has been determined on a case-by-case basis in a statutory state. Board of Educ. v.
Englewood Teachers Ass'n, 64 N.J. 1, 311 A.2d 729 (1973); Burlington County Col-
lege Faculty Ass'n v. Board of Trustees, 64 N.J. 10, 311 A.2d 733 (1973); Board
of Educ. v. Dunellen Educ. Ass'n, 64 N.J. 17, 311 A.2d 737 (1973). See also Aber-
deen Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 215 N.W.2d 837 (S.D. 1974); State College
Educ. Ass'n v. Labor Relations Bd., 9 Pa. Cmwlth. 229, 306 A.2d 404 (1973);
West Hartford Educ. Ass'n v. DeCourcy, 162 Conn. 566, 295 A.2d 526 (1972); Joint
School Dist. v. Employment Relations Bd., 37 Wis. 2d 483, 155 N.W.2d 837 (1967).
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the administrative agency is for and of what matters can best be left to pri-
vate decision.'a
This analysis will not be so bold as to suggest the proper decision-makers
for the various issues. Rather, it will delineate the various legal theories
which provide the context for the balancing process.
Dillon's Rule: The Ultra Vires View of Delegation
Historically, school boards and other units of local government have
been viewed as agents or creations of the state legislature for the purpose
of providing for public education.13  As such, a school board's exercise of
power has been strictly the product of state legislation. School boards are
deemed to have no power to engage in any activity which is not expressly
granted to them by the general assembly, implied from an express grant,
or essential to the accomplishment of the objective of the school district.14
This interpretation of the school board's power is an application of Dil-
lon's Rule; a legal proposition enunciated by Judge Dillon at the turn of
the century which has been cited as authority for many court decisions.
According to Judge Dillon:
-It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a municipal corpora-
tion possesses and can exercise the following powers, and no others: First,
those granted in express words; second, those necessarily or fairly implied
in or incident to the powers expressly granted; third, those essential to the
accomplishment of the declared objects and purposes of the corporation,-
not simply convenient, but indispensible. Any fair, reasonable, substantial
doubt concerning the existence of power is resolved by the courts against
the corporation .... 15
Note that the presumption against a grant of power, which resolves all
doubts against the local government unit, makes unlikely a finding of
12. H. HART & A. SACKS, Preface to THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW at iii (tent. ed. 1958).
13. Typical is this statement by the Kansas Supreme Court: "A school district
is an arm of the state existing only as a creature of the legislature to operate as a
political subdivision of the state." Wichita Public Schools Employees Union v. Smith,
194 Kan. 2, 4, 397 P.2d 357, 359 (1964). See also School Directors v. Fogleman,
76 111. 189 (1875).
14. People v. Bradley, 382 Ill. 383, 47 N.E.2d 93 (1943); School Directors v.
Fogleman, 76 Ill. 189 (1875); Glidden v. Hopkins, 47 Ill. 525 (1868); Rosenheim
v. City of Chicago, 12 Ill. App. 2d 382, 139 N.E.2d 856 (1st Dist. 1956); Harris
v. Kill, 108 Ill. App. 305 (Ist Dist. 1903).
15. 1 J. DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 448-49 (5th ed. 1911) [hereinafter
cited as DILLON]. The theory articulated by Judge Dillon, however, had been a part
of Illinois law for over half a century. See Betts v. Menard, 1 Ill. 395 (1831). Note
also that Dillon's Rule is virtually identical to the traditional approach to the doctrine
of ultra vires which was applied to private corporations. See H. HENN, LAW OF COR-
PORATIONs 352-53 (2d ed. 1970).
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power where it is not obvious that the legislature granted it.
Viewing school districts in this traditional light, delegation of school
board authority is ultra vires unless the delegation is either expressly au-
thorized by the legislature, impliedly authorized, or essential to the provid-
ing of public education.
Powers are conferred upon municipal corporations for public purposes; and
as -their legislative powers cannot . . . be delegated, so they cannot without
legislative authority, express or implied, be bargained or bartered away.16
Therefore, a delegation of school board authority pursuant to a negoti-
ated teacher agreement would be invalid on two counts. The agreement
to arbitrate would be invalid because the school board had bargained
away legislative powers, 17 and the delegation to an arbitrator would be
invalid, irrespective of the bargaining agreement, because the school board
is the only entity allowed to exercise school board powers.' s
The Discretionary-Ministerial Distinction
There is an exception carved into this general rule which places statu-
tory authority into two separate classifications: discretionary authority
where judgment is required and ministerial authority where the act is
mechanical. Dillon enunciated the exception in this manner:
[T]he public powers or trusts devolved by law or charter upon the council
or governing body, to be exercised by it when and in such manner as it
shall judge best, cannot be delegated to others ...
But the principle that the exercise of municipal powers or discretion can-
16. 1 DILLON 463 (emphasis added). See also 2 E. McQuELLiN, MUNICIPAL COR-
PORAToNs 843 (1966) [hereinafter cited as McQuiLLIN]. The rule that delegation
is only allowed pursuant to statutory authorization is not to be confused with a simi-
lar restriction on delegation discussed in the text accompanying notes 24-51 infra.
The Dillon's Rule restriction is based on a failure of the legislature to authorize the
delegation; while the other is purely a judicial restriction which is effective even
where there is legislative authorization.
17. As a school board . . . you may exercise only that authority which has
been granted to you by the School Code or other applicable statutes. There
is no provision in that Code which authorizes school boards to bargain col-
lectively with labor unions. And so, you can simply tell your teachers that,
since [the Code gives you] no authority . . . to bargain with unions, they
will have to go back home and await the day upon which the legislature
of the State of Illinois sees fit to grant you such authority.
Miller, The Alice-in-Wonderland World of Public Employee Bargaining, 50 Cm. B.
R c. 223, 223-24 (1969).
18. The two earliest Illinois decisions, both written by Justice Scott, are blatantly
contradictory as to whether the concept applies to arbitration. Compare Mann v.
Richardson, 66 Ill. 481 (1873) (where statutory authorization was found to be a pre-
requisite to arbitration), with City of Shawneetown v. Baker, 85 Ill. 563 (1877)
(where arbitration was allowed without a statute).
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not be delegated does not prevent a corporation from appointing agents...
and investing them with duties of a ministerial or administrative charac-
ter.19
The rationale for the discretionary-ministerial distinction is that in the in-
stance where a mechanical act is to be performed, it does not make any
difference who does it, but only that the act is done. In the case where
judgment is required there are usually several alternative resolutions, and
only the duly appointed agent of the state has the authority to take action.
In terms of school districts, the general rule is that a board of education
may delegate to subordinate officers "functions which are ministerial in
nature, where there is a fixed or certain standard or rule which leaves lit-
tle or nothing to the judgment of the subordinate. '20 This rule was ap-
plied in Illinois in Bessler v. Board of Education,21 where a school board
claimed that it had notified a teacher of its decision to fire her through
the personnel director. The court found that the evidence must show that
the school official "was merely conveying the action of the board"22 and
that without such evidence the notice is considered an invalid delegation
of school board authority.
The ministerial exception to the prohibition against delegation of author-
ity does not seem a promising avenue for those who wish to inject arbitra-
tion and teachers associations into the decision-making process. If these
parties are allowed only ministerial roles which do not require the exercise
of discretion, then the decision-making process is left to the school board
alone. That, of course, is exactly what the doctrine was designed to ac-
complish.23
Adequate Standards: The Reasonableness Limitation
If the Dillon's Rule limitation is inapplicable, because the school board
19. 1 DILLON 460-62.
A distinction is made between discretionary acts, which require the atten-
tion of the entire board, and ministerial acts, which require the exercise ofjudgment or discretion. As a general rule, ministerial acts and duties may
be delegated; discretionary acts and duties may not be delegated.
L. PETERSON, R. RosSMILLER, & M. VoLz, THE LAW AND PUBLIC SCHOOL OPERATION
(1969); see also 2 MCQUILLIN 854-58; 1 ANTIEAU § 5.31.
20. 3A ANTEAU § 30C.08 at 30C-25 n. 7.20 citing Big Sandy School Dist. v.
Carroll, 164 Colo. 173, 178, 433 P.2d 325, 328 (1967).
21. 11 111. App. 3d 210, 296 N.E.2d 89 (3d Dist. 1973).
22. Id. at 213, 296 N.E.2d at 91.
23. See text accompanying note 117 infra where a court used the distinction in
finding a grievance not arbitrable. But see text accompanying notes 120 & 121 infra
where the same court used the distinction to find another portion of the grievance
arbitrable.
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has the legal right to delegate authority,24 then the school board must
prescribe a standard or a norm to guide the exercise of any delegated au-
thority.25 This "adequate standards" limitation is purely judicial in nature,
however, and does not have a statutory origin. The court will apply
it only when it has determined that the school board is authorized
to delegate the authority. As stated by Antieau, "where school board
powers can be delegated, the law generally requires that reasonable stand-
ards be provided so as to limit as much as possible arbitrary conduct. '26
Significantly, the "adequate standards" limitation stems from the famil-
iar concept that local government units are limited to only those actions
which are reasonable. After an initial presumption in favor of the local
unit has been overcome, 27 arbitrary and capricious actions are invalidated
by the courts.28  School boards are accorded a like presumption.29
One aspect of the requirement for reasonableness is uniformity in appli-
24. The fact that a municipal corporation, or school district, must first have the
legislative authority to delegate is best illustrated by the rule as to ordinances:
An ordinance must, Irrespective of express power to enact it, provide a uni-
form rule of action; it must contain permanent legal provisions, operating
generally and impartially, and its enforcement cannot be left to the will or
unregulated discretion of any municipal authority, officer, or officers. Ar-
bitrary power conferred upon officers cannot be sustained.
5 McQULLUN 362-63 (emphasis added).
25. This rule that ffiunicipal legislation must prescribe a standard or norm
governing its enforcement and the exercise of any discretion invested in
municipal officers with respect to its enforcement is justified by, if not a
corollary of, the rule that a municipal legislative body cannot delegate its
legislative power.
5 McQuiLLIN 364.
26. 3A ANriEAu § 30C.08 at 30C-25.
27. The unreasonableness of an ordinance must clearly and plainly appear to
justify judicial condemnation of it on such ground. The unreasonableness
must be palpable on the face of the ordinance, or evidence of its unreason-
ableness extrinsic to the ordinance must clearly, plainly and palpably estab-
lish its unreasonableness, arbitrariness, or oppressiveness, in order to over-
come the presumption of its reasonableness ...
5 McQuLLIN 395-96.
28. "[Clourts will undertake in a proper case to determine whether an ordinance
is a reasonable exercise of a municipal power, and in no event will uphold an arbi
trary and unreasonable exercise thereof." Id. at 343.
29. Generally, school boards have a wide discretion in matters pertaining to
the management of schools, or, as otherwise stated, a school board has a
wide discretion in the exercise of its powers, and courts will not interfere
unless there has been such an abuse of discretion that the action appears
arbitrary and discriminatory.
33 ILL. LAW AND PRACTICE 127 (1970).
See, e.g., Richards v. Board of Educ., 21 IIl. 2d 104, 171 N.E.2d 37 (1961); Ran-
dolph v. School Unit 201, 132 Ill. App. 2d 936, 270 N.E.2d 50 (3d Dist. 1971).
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cation. Without the requisite uniformity, the action is considered arbitrary,
capricious or discriminatory. The requirement that adequate standards
must accompany a delegation of authority is directed at avoiding a vague,
uncertain and inconsistent application of authority.30 The theory is that
without the adequate standards accompanying the delegation, the officer
so vested may use the authority in an unreasonable manner. 3 '
The sources for the reasonableness limitation are varied. Reasonable
classification is thought to be implicit in the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution and school board
actions have been invalidated on that basis.3 2 The reasonableness limita-
tion is also found on the state level in the Illinois Constitution of 1970
in article II, section 2, the equal protection clause.33  Also, uniformity is
required in article IV, section 13, which bans special legislation. 34  On
the statutory level, reasonableness is an express limitation on any school
board rule or regulation.3 5
30. An ordinance to be reasonable and valid must be fair, impartial, and uni-
form in its operation. Although reasonableness is not inconsistent with a
reasonable classification of the subjects upon which it operates or the ob-jects of its enactment, an ordinance cannot unreasonably discriminate nor
vest discretion in enforcement officers without -a reasonable standard or
guide to govern them.
5 MCQUILLIN 353-54.
See, e.g., Pure Oil v. Northlake, 10 Ill. 2d 241, 140 N.E.2d 289 (1957); Lydy Inc.
v. Chicago, 356 11. 230, 190 N.E. 273 (1934); City of Sullivan v. Cloe, 277 Ill. 56,
115 N.E. 135 (1917). For application of this principle to school boards see Richards
v. Board of Educ., 21 Ill. 2d 104, 171 N.E.2d 37 (1961) where the court found that
the term "professional growth" was an adequate standard and did not constitute a
delegation of legislative power. See also People ex rel. Fursman v. City of Chicago,
199 111. App. 356 (1st Dist. 1916) where a school rule prohibiting union membership
was considered void as an unreasonable and discriminatory classification.
31. Arbitrary power conferred upon officers cannot be sustained. Indeed, it
is elementary that it is only when the norm or standard for discretionary
action under an ordinance is clearly set down that the ordinance can be en-
forced generally and impartially.
5 MCQUILLIN 362-64.
32. Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034 (1969); Bravo v. Board of Educ., 345 F. Supp.
155 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Courtney v. Board of Educ., 6 Ill. App. 3d 424, 286 N.E.2d
25 (Ist Dist. 1972); Laine v. Dittman, 125 Ill. App. 2d 136, 259 N.E.2d 824 (2d
Dist. 1970).
33. The major decision under the 1970 Constitution involving reasonable classifi-
cation is Grace v. Howlett, 51 Ill. 2d 478, 283 N.E.2d 474 (1972) where the court
considered both the equal protection clause, article II, section 2, and the ban on spe-
cial legislation, article IV, section 13. See also Courtney v. Board of Educ., 6 Ill.
App. 3d 424, 286 N.E.2d 25 (1st Dist. 1972).
34. Grace v. Howlett, 51111. 2d 478, 283 N.E.2d 474 (1972).
35. "[The board has the duty:] [t]o adopt and enforce all necessary rules for the
management and government of the public schools of their district." ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 122, § 10-20.5 (1973).
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The root of the reasonableness doctrine, however, comes from English
common law where local units received charters from the king which did
not specify the extent of the local unit's powers. It was found that this
broad grant of power from the sovereign was subject to the implied condi-
tion that all actions of the local unit must be reasonable.3 6 As early as
1766, in Rex v. Spencer,3 7 the reasonableness limitation was used to inval-
idate an ordinance because it was vague and uncertain and thought to con-
stitute a delegation of municipal authority. Since that time, the doctrine
has found its way into United States local government law.38
The reasonableness requirement that a delegation of authority be ac-
companied by "adequate standards" is conceptually very similar to the Dil-
lon's Rule exception which allows delegation of ministerial authority
where fixed norms and certain standards are provided.3 9  However, the
two limitations are distinctly dissimilar. The Dillon's Rule doctrine holds
that a delegation is invalid because it is outside the power conferred to
the local unit, i.e., it is ultra vires. The "adequate standards" doctrine,
by contrast, is purely a judicial limitation which restricts the delegation
of legislative authority regardless of statutory authorization. 40
The net result is three major differences. First, the "adequate stand-
ards" doctrine only purports to disallow unreasonable delegations of au-
thority.41 Second, unlike the Dillon's Rule application, the "adequate
36. In England, the subjects upon which by-laws may be made were not usu-
ally specified in the king's charter, and it became an established doctrine
of the courts that every corporation had the implied or incidental right to
pass by-laws; but this power was accompanied with these limitations,
namely that every by-law must be reasonable....
2 DILLON 924.
37. 97 Eng. Rep. 1121, 3 Burr. 1827 (1766). See also City of London v.
Vanacker, 91 Eng. Rep. 1231, 1 Ld. Raym. 496 (1699).
38. "The general principle thus formulated, derived from England, that the rea-
sonableness of the ordinance may be open to inquiry, prevails throughout the United
States." 5 MCQUILLIN 340. For an example of a United States court citing British
precedent in formulating the reasonableness limitation see In re Frazee, 63 Mich.
396, 30 N.W. 72 (1886).
39. This rule that municipal legislation must prescribe a standard or norm
governing its enforcement and the exercise of ... its enforcement is justi-
fied by, if it is not a corollary of, the rule that a municipal legislative body
cannot delegate its legislative power.
5 MCQUILLIN 364.
40. In legal literature the "adequate standards" limitation is sometimes referred
to as the "Ranney Rule" after the judge who authored the rule in an early opinion.
See Cincinnati W. & Z. Ry. v. Commissioners of Clinton County, 1 Ohio St. 77
(1852); Merrill, Standards-A Safeguard for the Exercise of Delegated Power, 47
NEB. L. REV. 469 (1968).
41. See notes 30-31 supra.
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standards" doctrine grants a presumption in favor of the local unit.42 Fi-
nally, and most importantly, the Dillon's Rule application is completely
dependent upon a failure of authorization to delegate. Once authorization
for delegation is found, the limitation is ineffective. The "adequate stand-
ards" limitation, by contrast, draws its authority from constitutional, statu-
tory and common law sources. Even where there is authorization to dele-
gate authority, the limitation applies. 43
The "adequate standards" limitation is also the test used by the courts
to review congressional delegation to administrative agencies. However,
the federal standard should be distinguished from the standard as it relates
to municipal corporations. The former is said to be derived from the sep-
aration of powers provision of the United States Constitution, whereas the
latter is based on the concept of reasonableness. 44 In addition, the federal
administrative standard has been regarded as a total failure in terms of
limiting delegations, while the municipal standard is still viable. 45
The Illinois Supreme Court has adopted the rule that a city is allowed
to delegate to others the authority to do those things which it might prop-
erly do itself but cannot do as understandingly or advantageously as long as
the delegation is accompanied by "adequate standards. ' 46 Using this prin-
42. See notes 27-29 supra.
43. Administrative action clearly outside the delegated field or not designed
to achieve the legislative objective would, in an appropriate judicial proceed-
ing, be held invalid as being outside the power delegated. Legislature and
judiciary here combine to prevent the administrative agency from acting
ultra vires.
A different method of limiting the area of administrative discretion is re-
flected in the proposition that "legislative power cannot be delegated." The
ultra vires doctrine says the administrative action is invalid because it is
outside the power conferred. The delegation doctrine says -the statute pur-
porting to confer the power is invalid because the legislature cannot delegate
its powers. When this doctrine is brought into play, the legislature and the
judiciary are no longer collaborators in placing limits upon the administra-
tive. Here, rather, the legislature has expressed a desire to grant author-
ity-and the judiciary has overruled the legislative choice.
W. GELLHORN & C. BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, CASES AND COMMENTS 58 (6th ed.
1974).
44. K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 2.00-.17 (1970 Supp.); Merrill,
supra note 40.
45. Compare the analysis of the federal standard in K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW TREATISE § 2.00 (1970 Supp.), with the analysis of the .municipal standard in
5 MCQUILLIN 362-366.
46. The principle was adopted from the law relating to delegation from 'the legis-
lature to the local unit. See Hill v. Relyea, 34 Ill. 2d 552, 216 N.E.2d 795 (1966);
Board of Educ. v. Page, 33 Ill. 2d 372, 211 N.E.2d 361 (1965). 'In the succeeding
cases, however, the rule is also applied where the delegation is from a local unit to
its officer.
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ciple, the court in Brown v. City of Chicago47 permitted the city to vest
in the city collector the authority to determine what information would be
required of prospective firearm licensees. The court found that such
delegation was permissible and not uncontrolled because the discretion was
narrowly limited. The principle was followed in Bloom, Inc. v. Kor-
shak,48 which involved a city cigarette tax. The court permitted the city
comptroller to assume the role of setting the commission schedule which.
would compensate the city's agents in administering the tax.
These cases stand for the proposition that a local government unit may
delegate considerable discretionary authority, provided that the major pol-
icy decisions are clearly specified and the authority is granted pursuant
to a function which the legislative body is not in an advantageous position
to perform. 49 By analogy, this principle would permit boards of education
to delegate to an arbitrator or teacher association its discretionary authority
where the delegation is pursuant to a specific and definitive provision and
where it is advantageous for the arbitrator or teacher association to exer-
cise that authority. However, Illinois courts have not squarely approached
the issue in regard to the negotiated agreements because of a reliance on
the Dillon's Rule non-delegation doctrine which precludes consideration of
the "adequate standards" test. In Brown and Bloom, Inc., however, the
courts seem to imply that the general principle would be held applicable
to school board delegations if the initial authority to delegate power were
found to exist.
There has only been one state court decision where the "adequate
standards" concept has been applied to arbitration. In Board of Educa-
tion v. Biddeford Teachers Association,"° the Maine Supreme Court con-
sidered a compulsory arbitration statute, which had been enacted by the
state legislature to resolve impasses in the negotiation of teacher contracts.
In this case, the statutory authority was found invalid on the ground that
legislative power had been delegated without inclusion in the authorizing
statute of "sufficient standards . . . to protect the teachers and the public
from possible arbitrary and irresponsible exercise of this delegated power
"51
47. 42 Il1. 2d 501, 250 N.E.2d 129 (1969).
48. 52 U. 2d 56, 284 N.E.2d 257 (1972).
49. The requirement that delegation must be to one who is in a more advanta-
geous or understanding position may have satisfied the criticism levied by Professor
Davis against the doctrine as it is applied by state courts. See 1 K. DAVIS, ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE (1958).
50. 304 A.2d 387 (Me. 1973).
51. Id. at 400.
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ARTICLE VII, SECTION 10 OF THE 1970 CONSTITUTION
The initial authority to delegate school board power may well have
come with the passage of the 1970 Illinois Constitution. 'It was the stated
purpose of the Convention to reverse Dillon's Rule by way of the local
government article.5 2 But, most significantly, the attack on Dillon's Rule
was not limited to the home rule provision of the constitution. Rather,
in the explanation of a non-home rule provision of the local government
article, section 10, Delegate Stahl said, on behalf of the Local Government
Committee, "we are trying here to reverse the Dillon psychology. '5 3 In
terms of the prohibition against delegating powers, the local government
article of the Illinois Constitution, section 10, appears to do just that.
Section 10. Intergovernmental Cooperation
(a) Units of local government and school districts may contract or other-
wise associate among themselves, with the State, with other states and their
units of local government and school districts, and with the United States to
obtain or share services and to exercise, combine, or transfer any power
or function, in any manner not prohibited by law or by ordinance. Units
of local government and school districts may contract and otherwise associ-
ate with individuals, associations, and corporations in any manner not pro-
hibited by law or ordinance (emphasis added).
The apparent meaning of the section indicates that traditional impedi-
ments to delegation of powers are removed to the extent that the legisla-
ture has not restricted that delegation by statute. 54 It would seem then
that the limitations on the power of school boards to negotiate contracts
with its teachers are unfettered unless prohibited by an act of the legisla-
ture. 55
Further, the Illinois Supreme Court has adopted the "clean slate" doc-
52. The Committee on Local Government Majority Proposal made specific refer-
ence to Dillon's Rule. See SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTTUTIONAL CONVENTION, 7 RECORD
OF THE PROCEEDINGS 1603-04 (1972) [hereinafter cited as RECORD OF TH= PROCEED-
INGS]. The committee reports and the entire Record of the Proceedings of the Con-
vention have been significant in the Illinois Supreme Court's interpretation of the
Illinois Constitution. See Lousin, Constitutional Intent: The Illinois Supreme Court's
Use of the Record in Interpreting the 1970 Constitution, 8 JOHN MARSHALL J. 189
(1975).
53. 4 RECORD OF THE PROCEEDINGS 3421.
54. "In effect, section 10 removes any legal objection to the delegation of govern-
ment powers on the local government level." Vitullo, Local Government: Recent
Developments in Local Government Law in Illinois, 1971-72 Survey of Illinois Law,
22 DEPAUL L. REV. 85, 94 (1972).
55. However, not all so called "home rule" powers allow such delegation. See
State v. Johnson, 46 Wash. 2d 114, 278 P.2d 662 (1955) where a "home rule" city
was held not to be empowered to delegate authority pursuant to a city charter which
authorized interest arbitration.
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trine which holds that section 9 of the constitution's transition schedule
makes home rule actions immune from the statutes passed prior to the
constitution and which contradict the power granted to them by the consti-
tution. 16 This would seem to indicate that legislation passed prior to 1971,
which provided the basis for Dillon's Rule limitations, cannot now limit
a school board even though they are non-home rule units. Such statutes
that contradict the grant of power given to the school boards by the con-
stitution are not effective as limitations.57
A more troublesome issue is whether the authority to "contract and oth-
erwise associate" with non-governmental entities is tantamount to author-
ity to delegate power. The Chicago Home Rule Commission claims that
to "contract and otherwise associate" 58 is inclusive of the concept of dele-
gation of power. Indeed, it would seem that contracting and associating
are indistinguishable from the additional language in the first sentence
which refers to contracting and associating for the purpose of obtaining
or sharing services and the exercise, combination or transfer of power
or functions.
In further support of this view are the Convention deliberations relat-
ing to the Mathis-Martin amendment. Delegate Mathis explained that the
amendment would grant to non-home rule units and school districts the
same power in relation to individuals, associations and corporations that
they were granted in relation to government entities. 59 Immediately after
his uncontradicted explanation, the Convention as a whole voted to adopt
the amendment.60
56. The "clean slate" doctrine does not void statutes predating the constitution.
But once a local unit takes affirmative action inconsistent with the state statute, the
statute no longer works as a limitation. See Peters v. City of Springfield, 57 Ill. 2d
142, 311 N.E.2d 107 (1974); Clarke v. Village of Arlington Heights, 57 Ill. 2d 50,
309 N.E.2d 576 (1974); People ex rel. Hanrahan v. Beck, 54 Ill. 2d 561, 301 N.E.2d
281 (1973); Kanellos v. County of Cook, 53 Ill. 2d 161, 290 N.E.2d 240 (1972).
See also Note, The "Clean Slate" Doctrine: A Liberal Construction of the Illinois
Home Rule Powers, 23 DEPAUL L. REv. 1298 (1974).
57. The Illinois Supreme Court gave passing notice to the doctrine in relation to
article VII, section 10, in Hoogasian v. Regional Trans. Auth., 58 Ill. 2d 117, 133,
317 N.E.2d 534, 543 (1974).
58. The Chicago Home Rule Commission Report and Recommendations 72-73
(1972).
59. Mr. Mathias: inhere are many special areas that come up, and this
would permit those non-home rule units to go ahead and make a contract,
unless it was in an area that has been prohibited by legislative action....
It would give them the same home rule powers in the private sector that
they have in the public sector.
5 REcoRD oF THE PROCEEDINGS 4444, 4445.
60. Id. at 4446.
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Despite the rather forthright meaning and expressed intent relating to
the section, there is apprehension lurking in the minds of some commenta-
tors that the courts will give a restrictive interpretation to the section. 1
The basis for the apprehension is twofold. First, if the two sentences in
fact convey the same power to delegate authority, it would seem -that the
draftsmen would have added the non-governmental entities to the first sen-
tence, rather than separate them into a second sentence with different lan-
guage. Second, Delegates Stahl and Wenum, who were appointed by the
Local Government Committee to handle the floor presentation of the sec-
tion, 2 expressed great concern over the delegation of government respon-
sibility to non-government entities. The history of the development of sec-
tion 10 will at least explain the reason for the above phenomenon, even
if it cannot ease the fear that the courts will interpret the section restric-
tively.
In addition to the Majority Committee proposal, there were four
amendments discussed at the Convention relating to this section. The first
proposal was presented in the Majority Report of the Local Government
Committee. This version had the vigorous support of Delegates Wenum
and Stahl, who defended the initial concept against the amendments which
were forthcoming. The Committee proposal was substantially the same as
,the present section 10 except that it did not contain the second sentence
which relates to non-governmental entities."3
Next in the process came the Martin amendment which added the non-
governmental entities to the first sentence of the section so that it would
read as follows:
Units of local government and school districts may agree, contract, co-
operate, and otherwise associate among themselves, with the State, with
other states and their units of local government and school districts, with
individuals, corporations, associations, and other entities and organizations
within or without Illinois.64
61. See Biebel, Home Rule in Illinois After Two Years: An Uncertain Be-
ginning, 6 JOHN MARSHALL J. 253, 301 (1973); The Chicago Home Rule Commission
Report and Recommendations 73 (1972).
62. 4 RECORD OF THE PROCEEDINGS at 3421.
63. Section 11, Intergovernmental Cooperation
11.1 Units of local government and school districts may agree, contract, co-
operate, and otherwise associate among themselves, with the State, with
other States and their units of local government and school districts, and
with the United States to obtain or share services and to exercise, combine,
or transfer any power or function, in any manner not prohibited by general
law.
7 RECORD OF THE PROCEEDINGS 1747.
64. 4 RECORD OF THE PROCEEDINGS 3425 (emphasis added).
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The debates relating to the Martin amendment show that the delegates
were well aware that the amendment would allow school districts and
other local government units to contract away their authority. It was ap-
provingly noted by Delegate Elward that such language would allow a
school district to contract with a private firm to take over the operation
of the local school system.65  Less approvingly, Delegate Wenum noted
that a community could contract with a private police service for its law
enforcement needs. 66 Troubled by this ability to delegate authority, We-
num said:
Where the problem comes in is in connection with powers. It might well
be, under this language, that a power could be transferred to an individual
or corporation; and this is not the intent of the committee [in its proposal].
• . . I believe constitutionally and legally as well as from the standpoint of
tradition, [that the powers of government are] to be held and guaranteed
in the hands of the units of government. .... 67
The Martin amendment failed on a tie vote. But immediately after it
failed, Delegate Stahl, on behalf of the Local Government Committee,
offered to incorporate the concept in a second sentence using different
language but embodying Delegate Martin's concerns. 68
Thus, the third phase of the development of the ,Intergovernmental Co-
operation section was Delegate Stahl's amendment. It inserted a new sen-
tence following the first and it did indeed deal with non-government enti-
ties: "When authorized by law, units of local government and school dis-
tricts may contract and otherwise associate with individuals, associations,
and corporations." 69 Strangely enough, even though the amendment em-
bodied the clearest expression of Dillon's Rule and the non-delegation doc-
trine, it met with no opposition. Delegate Parkhurst went so far as to
call the Convention's attention to the fact that this amendment was an "in-
corporation" of Martin's concept. Delegate Martin expressed his thanks
65. Mr. Elward: I support the [Martin] amendment. . . . The Gary,
Indiana, School District has contracted with a California firm ...to take
over the operation of one of the schools in Gary, in an underprivileged area.
This firm has agreed with the school district to receive the same amount
of money per pupil the school district is now spending; and ...at the end
of three years ...the corporation is to return to the school district the
$800 per year per pupil for each pupil below [the national average]. ...
With the amendment ... this kind of cooperation would be possible.
Id. at 3427-28.
66. Id. at 3426.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 3429.
69. 7 REconD OF THE PROCEEDINGS 2565 (emphasis added).
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for the consideration, apparently not realizing at this time the devastating
significance of the additional sentence.70
Steps four and five in the process came into play when the Martin
amendment sponsors realized the betrayal which the Stahl amendment em-
bodied. Delegate Mathis put forward the Mathis-Martin amendment
which transformed the section into its present langauge and reinstated the
authority of school districts and non-home rule units to delegate power to
non-governmental entities. 71 Before the vote, Delegate Stahl made a last
effort to block this authority by making an unofficial counter amendment
which reestablished the originally proposed language. 72 Presented with this
clear choice, the Convention opted to remove the bar on delegation of
powers by passing the Mathis-Martin amendment, eighty-two to five.73
Courts have not yet had the opportunity to determine whether section
10 allows the delegation of school board power. But in this respect it is
significant to note that in two other jursidictions, Indiana 74 and Ohio, 75
statutes7 6 similar to section 10 were held to grant school boards the author-
ity to enter into and be bound by negotiated agreements containing arbi-
70. Mr. Parkhurst: Just a word, Mr. President. .I want to call Delegate
Martin's attention to this amendment. This was his idea, I believe on first
reading, by amendment. We have now incorporated the idea, he will note
in the ultimate draft. Mr. Martin: Thank you.
5 RECORD OF THE PROCEEDINGS 4165.
71. See note 54 supra.
72. Mr. Stahl: I am more or less neutral on the Mathias and Martin Amend-
ment. . . . I feel . . . I represent the point of view of the Local Govern-
ment Committee and [if the amendment does not pass I] will vigorously
advocate my amendment to delete the sentence as it presently exists.
5 RECORD OF THE PROCEEDINGS 4445.
73. Id.
74. Gary Teachers Union v. School City, 31 Ind. Dec. 540, 284 N.E.2d 108 (3d
Dist. 1972).
75. Dayton Classroom Teachers Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 41 Ohio St. 2d 127, 323
N.E.2d 714 (1975).
76. [The School Board shall have the power] [t]o exercise any other power
and make any expenditure in carrying out its general powers and pur-
poses provided in sec. 201 [§ 28-17091 or in carrying out the powers deline-
ated in this sec. 202 which is reasonable from a business or educational
standpoint in carrying out school purposes of the school corporation, includ-
ing but not limited to the acquisition of property or the employment or con-
tracting for services, even though such power or expenditure shall not spe-
cifically be set out herein; ....
IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-1710(19) (1970).
The board of education of each school district shall be a body politic and
corporate, and, as such, capable of . . . contracting and being contracted
with ...
OHIo REv. CODE § 3313.17 (1973).
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tration clauses. In both cases there was no public employee bargaining
legislation to independently justify the delegation of -authority to an arbitra-
tor.
SCHOOL BOARD DELEGATION RELATING TO
GOVERNMENT ENTITIES
Dillon's Rule and the prohibition against delegating school board au-
thority first entered school law in Illinois early in this century when school
districts attempted to operate school systems in conjunction with other
school districts or with other government institutions. These early cases
are no longer considered an expression of valid 'Illinois law because of the
passage of the 1970 Illinois Constitution. The Intergovernmental Cooper-
ation section certainly allows local government units and school systems
to share facilities, even if it doesn't allow delegation of power in the
broader context.77 Also worth noting is that these early cases are instances
where a taxpayer intervened seeking to limit school board authority. In
contrast, later decisions have the school board seeking limitations on their
own authority to make agreements in relation to non-salary provisions.
A 1906 case, Lindblad v. Board of Education,78 involved an effort by
a taxpayer to enjoin the Normal Board of Education from executing an
agreement which would integrate the school board's facilities and faculty
with Illinois State Normal University's model school. The court strictly
applied the non-delegation of powers doctrine. It first looked to the legis-
lative enactment upon which the board depended for its authority. In this
instance, the authority stemmed from the legislative act which incorporated
the Town of Normal79 and which provided a general authority for the
77. See note 63 supra; Bieble, Home Rule in Illinois After Two Years: An Un-
certain Beginning, 6 JOHN MARSHALL J. 253, 299-302 (1973); Note, The Illinois In-
tergovernmental Cooperation Act, 1974 U. ILL. L.F. 498. The Local Government
Committee expressed its intended purpose for the Intergovernmental Cooperation sec-
tion as follows:
The purpose of this new section is to provide maximum flexibility to units
of local government in working out solutions to common problems in con-
cert with other units of local government at all levels "in any manner not
prohibited by general law." Paragraph 11.1 [10al will permit multi-unit
endeavors in all areas of local concern.
Report of the Local Government Committee, 7 RECORD oF THE PROCEEDINGS 1747.
Interpretations, however, have not been particularly faithful to the intent of the
Committee. See Connelly v. Clark County, 16 I11. App. 3d 947, 307 N.E.2d 128
(4th Dist. 1974); ILL. Op. Arr'y GEN. No. S-696 (Feb. 13, 1974); ILL. Op. A'r'y
GEN. No. S-391 (Jan. 6, 1972).
78. 221 Ill. 261, 77 N.E. 450 (1906).
79. Article VIII, section 11
The said -board of education shall have the entire management and control
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school board to operate a school system. Arguably, it might be said that
the power was limited only by the statutory purpose of providing a "good
system of public instruction." The court disagreed, specifically citing Dil-
lon.80 It noted that the grant of power was one of great discretion on the
part of the school board. But the discretionary authority was limited to
the rights and duties necessary for the proper management of the schools.
The court found that employing, discharging and assigning of teachers, as
well as establishing the length of the school terms, were necessary to the
management of the schools and thus properly within the discretion of the
school board. But the scope of the discretion did not encompass the power
to delegate authority. Presumably, such delegations are unnecessary to the
management of the school system and on that basis are ultra vires.
Lindblad was followed on the appellate level by Stroh v. Casnersl which
upheld a taxpayer suit which sought to enjoin the issuing of bonds neces-
sary to carry out a contractual agreement between two school districts to
jointly build, maintain and use school facilities.
SCHOOL BOARD DELEGATION RELATING TO
NON-GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES
More recent applications of the prohibition on delegation of school
board power have most often involved situations where the school board
has sought to disclaim delegation of authority to an individual or arbitra-
tion association. Using the doctrine as a shield, school boards have often
attempted to repudiate contractual agreements by way of disavowing any
ability to have made the agreements. This strategy has led observers to
note that the prohibition against delegation of powers doctrine is mainly
an argument to retain unilateral action by governmental units rather than
a valid constitutional consideration.8 2
of all the common schools, and transact all business which may be neces-
sary in relation to said common schools in said district, and shall have all
the rights, powers and authority necessary for the proper management of
the schools and school funds, with the power to make all such rules, orders
and requirements as they may deem necessary, to carry their powers and
duties into effect and perfect a good system of public instruction and com-
mon schools in said district.
3 ILL. PRIVATE LAWS 1867 at 333.
80. 221 IlI. at 271, 77 N.E. at 453.
81. 201 Ill. App. 281 (3d Dist. 1916).
82. Most writers and experts, today, suggest that the sovereignty argument
is inappropriate. . . . Today there are many examples of governmental
units at all levels that have been engaged in the practice of collective bar-
gaining for a long period of time. It is probably true that the sovereignty
argument is mainly an argument to retain unilateral actions by govern-
[Vol. 24:1731748
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When the courts have limited the negotiated agreements, they have
taken the attitude that the school board has acted outside its statutory au-
thority, and thus, according to Dillon's Rule, such action is not valid .3
The purely judicial limitation, which is effective regardless of statutory au-
thorization and limits delegations pursuant to "adequate standards, '8 4 has
not yet entered the decisions.
A 1965 case, Elder v. Board of Education,5 was -the first in a series
involving school board delegation to non-governmental entities. The
plaintiff, a teacher, claimed that she had relied on statements by the super-
intendent and had lost her job on the basis of that reliance. She argued
that the school board had waived its right not to re-employ her because of
the superintendent's statements. Applying the non-delegation doctrine,
the court noted that the power to make binding promises relating to em-
ployment rests only with the school board, and that the superintendent did
not possess the powers to make "representations" as to tenure or to waive
any rights of the school district.
A year later, in Chicago Division of the Illinois Education Association
v. Board of Education,"6 a taxpayer intervenor attempted to prevent the
school board from bargaining with teacher organizations on the basis that
such bargaining constituted a delegation of school board authority. The
court chose to define delegation in a restricted sense and determined that
delegation through the bilateral process of collective bargaining was within
the scope of school board powers, even without legislative authority.
In 1972, the issue of delegation to another for a unilateral determination
was litigated in Board of Education v. Rockford Education Association.87
In this case the teachers association and the board of education had en-
tered into a negotiated agreement which had an arbitration clause. Prior
to the effective date of the agreement, the board distributed an "announce-
ment of vacancy" to the members of the instructional staff, including How-
ward Getts who was employed as a guidance counselor by the district.
The announcement invited applications for the position of director of per-
sonnel and recruitment. Getts applied for the job and was recommended
mental units, rather than a valid constitutional argument against collective
bargaining.
Illinois Institute for Continuing Legal Educ., 1 ILLINOIS MUNICIPAL LAW § 6.6
(1974).
83. See text accompanying notes 13-18 supra.
84. See text accompanying notes 24-51 supra.
85. 60 Il. App. 2d 56, 208 N.E.2d 423 (1st Dist. 1965).
86. 76 111. App. 2d 456, 222 N.E.2d 243 (1st Dist. 1966).
87. 3 I11. App. 3d 1090, 280 N.E.2d 286 (2d Dist. 1972).
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by the superintendent of schools. However, the board of education re-
jected his application and declined to fill the position at all.
After his rejection, Getts invoked the grievance procedure of the con-
tract and claimed that the board had violated an article of the agreement
which provided that all promotional positions would be filled according to
certain procedures and "on the basis of qualification for the vacant post
. . ." The grievance procedure included the preliminary steps to arbi-
tration. When arbitration was demanded, the board filed a complaint to
stay arbitration and asked for a declaratory judgment. The board argued
that the matter of selection or employment of personnel was not arbitrable
because it was not included in the professional agreement, and was not
delegable by the board. The trial court found for the board.
On appeal, the education association used Dillon's Rule logic, arguing
that contracts within the express and implied powers of the school board
do not constitute a delegation of the school board's authority. For sup-
port, the association looked to School District No. 46 v. Del Bianco,88
where the school board entered into a contract with an architect under
the authority of the School Code provision that the board had the duty
to "build or move a school house."89 In Del Bianco, there was no question
raised as to whether the board's power was limited or delegated by the
arbitration clause in the contract. Similarly, the association argued,90 the
school board had entered into a negotiated contract with its staff under
the authority of the School Code provision that the board had the duty
to "appoint all teachers and fix salaries." 91 The association claimed that
there was no basis for disinction between the contracts.
88. 68 Ill. App. 2d 145, 215 N.E.2d 25 (2d Dist. 1966).
89. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 10-20.11 (1961).
90. Brief for the Appellants at 26-27, Board of Educ. v. Rockford Educ. Ass'n,
3 Ill. App. 3d 1090, 280 N.E.2d 286 (2d Dist. 1972).
91. [The School Board has the duty] [t]o appoint all teachers and fix the
amount of their salaries, subject to the limitations set forth in this Act ...
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 10-20.7 (1969). In fact, there is currently no distinction
made by the legislature as to any of the duties imposed on the school board by the
School Code.
[The School Board has the duty] [tlo adopt and enforce all necessary rules
for the management and government of the public schools of their district.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 10-20.5 (1973).
[The School Board has the duty] [t]o establish and keep in operation during
a school term of at least the minimum length required by Section 10-19....
ILL. REV. STAT. eh. 122, § 10-20.12 (1973).
[The School Board has the duty] [tlo keep and maintain, in good repair, all
division fences between school grounds and adjoining lands.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 10-20.16 (1973).
[The School Board has the duty] [t]o provide for the schools in their
district an adequate, clear, palatable and safe supply of water for drinking
750 [Vol. 24:731
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The Rockford court denied the association's arguments using an abbre-
viated application of Dillon's Rule or the ultra vires non-delegation doc-
trine. The school board, claimed the court, could not agree to either limit
or delegate any power "granted to it by the School Act."'92  Since the de-
termination of qualifications for hiring is a power granted by the School
Code, the court reasoned, it was one which could not be delegated. Un-
fortunately, the court did not discuss Del Bianco, which involved the power
to build schools, a power granted the school board by the School Code.
It is possible, albeit impractical, to view the Rockford case as holding
that any item which is expressly vested in the school board by the School
Code is not to be limited or delegated. This interpretation is fraught with
problems. Not only would this contradict Chicago Division; but also it
would have the school board personally build schools, nail by nail, pro-
vide water, pail by pail, and repair fences, post by post. These are duties
or powers specifically granted to the school 'board in the School Code.98
Such a view becomes even less practical when one considers that all the
school board's powers are granted to it by virtue of the School Code. A
broad reading of the Rockford holding, under this view, would have the
school board being able to delegate only those powers which it did not
have, thus making all contracts by the board voidable.9 4
The more practical view of the holding is that it calls for the court to
engage in the legal fiction of determining whether a School Code provision
is one which the legislature intended to be delegable. Note that whether
a power is one granted exclusively to the school board or merely granted
purposes and for general school use.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 122, § 10-20.17 (1973).
92. 3 Ill. App. 3d at 1093-94, 280 N.E.2d at 288. In addition to basing the deci-
sion on the non-delegation doctrine, the Rockford court also found that there was
no agreement to arbitrate the issue. Other states also follow -the Rockford line of
reasoning and refuse to accept any limitation on the school board's authority. See,
e.g., Peters v. Board of Educ., 506 S.W.2d 429 (Mo. 1974).
93. See text accompanying notes 89 & 91 supra.
94. Being able to delegate only those powers which one does not have can be
analogized to the impossible "catch" one had to overcome to avoid flying more mis-
sions in J. Heller's novel on the absurdity of war, CATCH 22:
There was only one catch and that was Catch-22, which specified that a
concern for one's own safety in the face of dangers that were real and im-
mediate was the process of a rational mind. Orr was crazy and could be
grounded. All he had to do was ask; and as soon as he did, he would no
longer be crazy and would have to fly more missions. Orr would be crazy
to fly more missions and sane if he didn't, but if he was sane he had to
fly them. If he flew them he was crazy and didn't have to; but if he didn't
he was sane and had to. Yossarian was moved very deeply by the absolute
simplicity of this clause of Catch-22. ...
J. HELLER, CATCH 22 at 44 (paper ed. 1961).
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without exclusive intent is a matter determined solely by a court. The
legislative language in the given sections in Rockford and Del Bianco is
identical. If the legislature had any intent with respect to the matter, it
was not expressed in words.
A more logical approach to determine which items of the School Code
are exclusively granted to the school board would be to use the discre-
tionary-ministerial distinction. Accordingly, items which infringe upon a
school board's discretionary powers to manage and control internal affairs
of a school district cannot be delegated. On the other hand, discretionary
powers are limited to the internal operations of the school which leaves
such matters as architect agreements in the realm of ministerial authority
and therefore delegableY5 To view the Rockford holding in the most fa-
vorable light is to adopt this approach.
An arbitration clause was again the subject matter of litigation in Board
of Education v. Champaign Education Association,96 a 1973 case. The
association filed a grievance which culminated in arbitration pursuant to
a collective bargaining agreement. The grievance involved the length of
the teacher's lunch period. The arbitrator decided in favor of the associ-
ation and the board asked the court to set aside the award. On appeal,
the board did not argue that they had no power to delegate their discre-
tionary authority as the board in Rockford argued. However, the conten-
tion was clearly available to the board because the power to establish a
lunch period is a discretionary power relating to the ability of the board
to adopt necessary rules for the management of the public schools.9 7
The court decided the case on the basis of the Uniform Arbitration
Act,98 finding that the court was allowed to vacate the award because the
arbitrator exceeded the authority granted him under the agreement. The
95. Arbitration agreements between school boards and architects or other
independent contractors, by their very nature, do not impinge upon a school
board's discretionary powers to manage and control the internal affairs of
a school district. A board's discretionary powers are broad but nevertheless
are limited to the internal operations of the school. Such discretionary
powers properly include a -board's power to make the final determination
as to the hiring, firing, transferring, and assigning of its own personnel. On
the other hand, its discretionary powers do not include the power to make
[a] final determination as to disputes the school district may have with in-
dividuals outside of the school district over matters which do not involve
the internal operations of the schools.
Brief for the Appellee at 31, Board of Educ. v. Johnson, 21 111. App. 3d 482, 315
N.E.2d 634 (Ist Dist. 1974).
96. 15 II. App. 3d 335, 304 N.E.2d 138 (4th Dist. 1973).
97. See note 91 supra.
98. ILL. REv. STAT. Ch. 10, §§ 101 etseq. (1973).
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only reason the award was not valid was because it was not based on an
express provision in the agreement. The Champaign court noted that had
the arbitration award been pursuant to an express term, it would have
been valid. 99
Significantly, Del Bianco was cited and, indeed, quoted as precedent for
the decision. Champaign thus appears to stand in direct opposition to the
Rockford holding. 100 This is not to say that the decision is without a legal
foundation apart from Del Bianco. Using Dillon's Rule language to justify
the decision, it could be said that the arbitration clause was "incident" to
the power to contract and thereby "implied" from the authority to "hire
all teachers."
Finally, in 1974 an appellate court attempted to deal with an arbitra-
tion agreement in an analytical manner. In Board of Education v. John-
son,1' 1 two separate grievances arose from an arbitration clause in a nego-
tiated agreement. In the first, a teacher complained that the school board
had breached the agreement by involuntarily transferring her to another
school when a teacher with less seniority should have been transferred.10 2
The second grievance involved two teachers who were required to keep
monthly attendance cards, allegedly in violation of a provision in the
agreement relieving teachers from clerical tasks.10 3  The teachers associ-
99. 15 Ill. App. 3d 335, 341, 304 N.E.2d 138, 142 (4th Dist. 1973).
100. Id. at 342, 304 N.E.2d at 143.
101. 21 Ill. App. 3d 482, 315 N.E.2d 634 (1st Dist. 1974).
102. Article IV Section 2. It is agreed that:
(b) Whien involuntary transfer or reassignment is necessary, volunteers
from those teachers affected will be transferred or reassigned first. A
teacher's qualification, length of service in School District 111 and personal
preference shall be major criteria in determining such transfers or reassign-
ments;
(c) The administration, in interpreting teacher qualifications, shall use the
following guidelines:
1. Certification;
2. Area of specialization (including degrees, research, publications,
etc.);
3. Pertinent experience (educational and vocational); and
4. Teacher's ability as reflected by the whole of the teacher's written
evaluation in the District.
Section 9. Transfers made because of decreased pupil enrollment in the
building shall be based on seniority. If it is necessary to move the teacher
out of the school . . .. the classification being reduced shall be the first
transferred, and so on. ...
Id. at 484-85 n.4, 315 N.E.2d at 637 n.4, quoting from the negotiated agreement.
103. Section 4. No teacher shall be assigned duties that are principally cler-
ical in nature, such as . . . the compilation of monthly and yearly attend-
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ation pursued arbitration on both grievances and the school board filed
for a stay of arbitration and a declaratory judgment.
The trial court found that neither grievance was arbitrable. 10 4 In deal-
ing with the teacher transfer, the trial court applied the Rockford rationale,
stating that the grievance was not arbitrable because it was a delegation
of the school board's authority. That rationale would not as readily apply
to the second grievance because teachers, not the board, were delegating
the attendance-taking responsibility. Recognizing this distinction, the trial
court found that arbitration of the attendance-taking grievance was not
arbitrable because it was an attempt to contravene the section of the
School Code that required teachers to keep attendance. 10 5 Thus, in effect,
the trial court extended the Rockford non-delegation principle to teachers.
The analytical encumbrances that accompanied Rockford apply equally
to this finding. 10
The appellate court, in Johnson, embarked on a comparatively sophisti-
cated analysis in dealing with the issues. Initially, the court found that
as a general rule "minor disputes" or "grievance disputes" are arbitra-
ble. 1°7 "Minor disputes" are defined in the legal literature cited by the
court "as those concerning interpretation and/or application of an exist-
ing labor contract .... ,,l08 The term is used in contrast to "major dis-
putes" which are those disputes "concerning the terms of employment to
be incorporated into a collective bargaining agreement."' 1 9 According to
this definition, both the teacher transfer and the attendance-taking griev-
ances would be considered "minor disputes." The general principle that
such disputes are arbitrable was based upon Chicago Division of the llli-
ance records, provided that reasonable notice of clerical assistance require-
ments is given by the teacher to the Building principal or his designee.
Id.
104. Id. at 486, 315 N.E.2d at 637, citing the trial court's holding.
105. Teachers shall keep daily registers showing the name, age and attend-
ance of each pupil, the day of the week, month and year. Registers shall
be in the form prescribed by the Superintendent of Public Instruction....
No teacher shall be paid any part of the school funds unless he has kept
and returned such a register.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 24-18 (1971).
106. See text accompanying notes 93-95 supra.
107. [W]e are of the opinion -that arbitration of certain "minor" disputes
pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement does not constitute a delega-
tion by the board, and we believe they should be submitted to binding arbi-
tration in the event of impasse.
21 Ill. App. 3d at 491, 315 N.E.2d at 641.
108. Note, Legality and Propriety of Agreements to Arbitrate Major and Minor
Disputes in Public Employment, 54 CORNELL L. REv. 129 n.6 (1968).
109. Id.
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nois Education Association v. Board of Education,1 0 cases from states
that had statutory authorization for collective bargaining, and law review
articles which indicated that arbitration is a necessary step to implement
a negotiated agreement."' Also, the Johnson court noted that Indiana,
a non-statutory state, had adopted the principle using as a basis the Uni-
form Arbitration Act, a statute that is also available in the Illinois legal
setting. 1 2
Although the Johnson court adopted the general proposition that "minor
disputes" are arbitrable, the principle was substantially eroded by a con-
comitant finding that "certain matters are specifically reserved to the board
by the Illinois School Code" and cannot be delegated without statutory
authority.1 3  Elder v. Board of Education,1 4 Stroh v. Casner,"15 and
Lindblad v. Board of Education' 6 were cited as examples of delegation
in contravention of the School Code. Note that this blatant reaffirmation
of Dillon's Rule non-delegation doctrine in reality contradicts the initially
accepted principle that "minor disputes" are arbitrable.
,In determining that the teacher transfer grievance was one that was not
arbitrable, the court used the discretionary-ministerial distinction 1 7 to de-
termine the validity of the delegation. The agreement required that the
transfer of a teacher be based upon four guidelines: certification, speciali-
zation, experience, and ability."" The Johnson court found those guide-
lines inadequate because they allowed the arbitrator to exercise his own
judgment.
[T]he agreement . . . does not inform us as to the manner in which they
should be used nor does it indicate the weight to be accorded each guide-
line.
... Under these circumstances, to allow an arbitrator to review the de-
cision of the administration would permit the substitution of the arbitrator's
110. 76 Ill. App. 2d 456, 222 N.E.2d 243 (1st Dist. 1966).
111. Wellington & Winter, Structuring Collective Bargaining in Public Employ-
ment, 79 YALE L.J. 805, 834 (1970); Note, Collective Bargaining for Public Em-
ployees and the Prevention of Strikes in the Public Sector, 68 MicH. L. REV. 260, 280
(1969).
112. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 10, §§ 101 et seq. (1973). The principal case, Gary
Teachers Union v. School City, 31 Ind. Dec. 540, 284 N.E.2d 108 (3d Dist. 1972)
also used a statute which granted the school board broad powers in making contracts.
See note 76 supra.
113. 21 Ill. App. 3d at 492, 315 N.E.2d at 642.
114. 60 111. App. 2d 56, 208 N.E.2d 423 (1st Dist. 1965).
115. 201 Ill. App. 281 (3d Dist. 1916).
116. 221 Ill. 261, 77 N.E. 450 (1906).
117. See text accompanying notes 19-23 supra.
118. See note 102 supra.
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judgment as to the relative importance of each guideline in the ultimate
decision."10
In this regard the court cited Rockford as precedent.
Significantly, however, the Johnson court left open the possibility that
in another case where the contract is very specific about the standards
which an arbitrator is to use in determining a breach of the agreement,
a court may hold teacher transfer grievances arbitrable. The logical ex-
tension of the court's finding is that where the contract specifies the manner
in which guidelines are to be used and the weight accorded each guide-
line, the matter is arbitrable. Thus, teacher transfer provisions are not
inherently considered a delegation of power.
The Johnson court also used the discretionary-ministerial distinction in
finding the attendance-taking grievance arbitrable. In overruling the
lower court decision, the court said that the question of whether the "stu-
dents' names were to be filled in by the school clerk or by the individual
teacher" was not within the contemplation of the legislature. Thus, "the
statute refers only to the mechanical function of filling in, on a daily basis,
the attendance.' 2 0  It is more than coincidence that the decision uses lan-
guage which was based on the discretionary-ministerial distinction. The
court was made aware of the distinction by the arguments in the appellate
briefs.12 '
There was wisdom, however, in the court's failure to fully articulate the
discretionary-ministerial distinction. Although the distinction would pre-
vent the school board from having to personally perform duties mandated
by the School Code, such as fence repair and the provision of fresh water,
,because they are ministerial; it would also lock the courts into finding, as
incapable of delegation, the duty, also mandated by the Code, to establish
all rules and regulations because of their discretionary nature. Application
of the discretionary-ministerial distinction, for instance, would disallow ar-
bitration of the attendance-taking grievance if it were pursuant to a rule
or regulation of the school board.
DELEGATION IN AGREEMENTS WITHOUT ARBITRATION CLAUSES
School board attempts to retrieve their authority from negotiated agree-
ments that do not contain arbitration clauses have been singularly unsuc-
119. 21 Ill. App. 3d at 493, 315 N.E.2d at 643.
120. Id. at 495, 315 N.E.2d at 644.
121. The school board used the distinction to differentiate Del Bianco. Brief for
the Appellee at 31, Board of Educ. v. Johnson, 21 IMl. App. 3d 482, 315 N.E.2d 634
(lst Dist. 1974).
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cessful. Two recent cases deal with negotiated agreements that impose
conditions precedent to the exercise of board authority. In a broader con-
text, these cases may provide the basis for the courts to review teacher
agreements through the doctrine that school board actions must be reason-
ably related to the providing of public education. This doctrine would
allow courts to engage in a balancing process in determining the validity
of negotiated agreement provisions.
In the first such case, Classroom Teachers Association v. Board of Ed-
ucation,'22 the negotiated agreement included a provision which required
certain procedures relating to notification of transfer, notification of rea-
sons for the transfer, evaluation and a hearing on the transfer, to be prece-
dent to any involuntary teacher transfer. The board transferred a teacher
without following these procedures and the association filed suit to have
her reassigned to the original position. The board, relying on Rockford,
argued that the negotiated provision was a limitation on the exercise of
the board's authority to appoint all teachers and, therefore, a delegation
of that authority.
The appellate court rejected this position, finding that no provision of
the agreement restricted the board's authority to hire, discharge, or trans-
fer teachers. Such conditions precedent to the exercise of such authority
were found to be "fair and reasonable," suggesting that the court relied
on the reasonableness standard in making its decision.
The Board has voluntarily agreed to follow reasonable and fair evalua-
tion procedures preliminary to any involuntary transfer of the teacher. If
the Board had kept its bargain it would have had the basis of making an
informed judgment prior to the transfer of the plaintiff teacher who, in
turn, would have had clear warning of her deficiencies with ample oppor-
tunity to correct them or to suffer the consequences. We believe that such
bargain is consonant with public policy and should be enforced.
123
Note that the court placed a presumption in favor of the negotiated agree-
ment. But apparently such a presumption could be overcome upon a
showing of "unreasonableness."'1 24
The concept was followed in Illinois Education Association v. Board of
Education,'125 where a similar provision required conditions precedent to
the discharge of a teacher. The court in that case granted tenure status
to a non-tenured teacher who was dismissed by the board without perform-
ance of the conditions. It can be argued that these cases stand for the
122. 15 Ill. App. 3d 224, 304 N.E.2d 516 (3d Dist. 1973).
123. Id. at 229, 304 N.E.2d at 520 (emphasis added).
124. See text accompanying notes 23 & 24 supra.
125. 23 Ill. App. 3d 649, 320 N.E.2d 240 (Ist Dist. 1974).
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proposition that once a school board enters into an agreement, it is bound
by it, provided that the agreement is a reasonable exercise of school board
authority.
The holdings in these cases are similar to the rule expressed in cases
which relate to salary schedules. In People ex rel. Cinquino v. Board of
Education,126 the board had determined that a teacher had a foreign aca-
demic degree which was equivalent to a doctorate. Later, the board de-
cided to reevaluate the degree with the result that it revoked the teacher's
doctorate status, and reduced him on the salary schedule. The court
found that once the board had exercised its discretion to formulate salary
policy, there was a presumption in favor of the original determination.
This is virtually identical to contract law.127 The rule was best expressed
in the case of Cohn v. Board of Education.128
[O]nce the Board of Education has exercised its discretion to interpret its
rules liberally so that a teacher is placed in a certain salary bracket, it had
no power to later rerate that teacher perspectively on the theory that the
original rating was too high. Once having acted, the Board, in the absence
of fraud, duress or mistake, has lawfully exhausted its power over that sub-
ject matter. 1 2 9
The common factor in all of these cases is that on certain matters the
courts will place a presumption in favor of an agreement made by the
school board. In situations where salaries are concerned that presumption
is overcome only by contract defenses. But in non-salary situations the
presumption may be overcome by a showing that the agreement is unrea-
sonable.
This proposition suggests that to retrieve its authority from an agreement
the board must demonstrate to the courts that its initial entry into the
agreement was unreasonable and therefore invalid. Reasonableness, in this
respect, is a different aspect of the same principle discussed previously. 30
The reasonableness limitation seemingly contemplated by the court in
Classroom Teachers refers to whether the negotiated provision is reason-
ably related to the providing of a system of public education. Antieau
has stated that "the acts of school authorities must be within the au-
thority committed to them and must bear some rational relation to the fur-
thering of the objects for which the board exists.'' It was found in
126. 86 Ill. App. 2d 298, 230 N.E.2d 85 (1st Dist. 1967).
127. 12 ILL. LAW AND PRAcTIcE, Contracts ch. 6, §§ 115-26 (1955).
128. 118 Ill. App. 2d 453, 254 N.E.2d 803 (2d Dist. 1970).
129. Id. at 458, 254 N.E.2d at 805.
130. See text accompanying notes 24-51 supra.
131. 3A ANTiEAu § 30C.08 at 30C-24.
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Classroom Teachers that "[t]he procedures in the agreement only serve
to maintain a high standard of efficiency and professionalism in the school
system."'18 2 The court indicated that the result would have been different
without such a finding.
We agree with the trial judge that public schools are not created nor are
they supported for the benefit of the teachers therein, but for the benefit of
the pupils and the resulting benefit to their parents and the community at
large. 183
The fact that the provision in the agreement was reasonably related to the
school system's purpose appeared to be the major factor in sustaining the
provision.
CONCLUSION
,It should be apparent that the prohibition on delegation as it stems from
Dillon's Rule cannot provide a basis for cogent and consistent court deci-
sions in relation to negotiated teacher agreements. The doctrine's validity
can be questioned in two major respects.
First, the Illinois Constitution of 1970 purports to remove prohibitions
on the delegation of school board authority, and it may be considered to
authorize the school board to make any negotiated contract. Second, the
doctrine is the manifestation of a legal philosophy which sought to retain
absolutely government power in the hands of -the legislature and its
agents. Traditionally, collective bargaining was precluded by that doc-
trine. In spite of this fact, courts have authorized the negotiations in the
first instance and then have attempted to control and check the provisions
of the resulting agreements by way of once again dredging up the Dillon's
Rule ultra vires rationale. This puts the courts in the position of trying
to balance interests through a doctrine which is void of balancing concerns.
Further, since the doctrine is dependent on the School Code, the courts
are forced to pretend to find legislative intent to authorize delegation
where, in fact, the legislature had expressed no intent.
This problem is caused by an honest attempt on the part of the courts
to regulate the negotiated agreements. However, a better mechanism for
regulation is available in the rule established in Brown v. City of Chi-
cagol1 4 and Bloom, Inc. v. Korshak,185 where the "adequate standards"
requirement of the reasonableness limitation was delineated. The rule
132. 15 Ill. App. 3d at 228, 304 N.E.2d at 519.
133. Id. at 229, 304 N.E.2d at 520.
134. 42 111. 2d 501,250N.E.2d 129 (1969).
135. 52 Il1. 2d 56, 284 N.E.2d 257 (1972).
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would allow the school board to "delegate to others the authority to do
those things which it properly could do itself but cannot do as understand-
ingly or advantageously"'136 as long as the delegation provides adequate
standards. This principle, in combination with the reasonable relationship
to the "providing of education" principle expressed in Classroom Teach-
ers, provides the courts with an array of balancing mechanisms by which
to review teacher agreements.
Pursuant to this standard of review a school board would be permitted
to retrieve authority from a negotiated agreement in three ways. First,
the school board could demonstrate that the agreement did not embody
adequate standards and that, therefore, the agreement permitted the dele-
gation of uncontrolled discretion. Second, the board could show that a
teacher association or arbitrator is not in an advantageous position to
exercise the delegated authority. And third, by using the "relationship
to purpose" test, the school board could show that the agreement provi-
sion does not bear a rational relationship to a "good system of pub-
lic instruction." If courts review agreements in this manner, it will
allow them to inject a balance of public interest against the teachers' con-
tract rights. Such a balance is virtually impossible with the present Dil-
lon's Rule limitation.
Such a standard would, in the first instance, grant a presumption in fa-
vor of the provision in the negotiated agreement and this would take the
courts out of the position of making school policy decisions that should
have been made at the bargaining table. In the past the courts have wisely
refused to review school board policies when there is no showing that the
policies are unreasonable: "[T]he judiciary -is ill equipped to act as a super
school board in assaying the complex factors involved in determining the
best interests of schools and pupils affected."'187 The negotiated agree-
ment should be considered another such policy, and courts should be
reticent in voiding such agreements.
A final advantage of the "adequate standards" approach to regulating
delegation is that it is not invalidated by article VII, section 10 of the 1970
Illinois Constitution. Unlike the Dillon's Rule limitation, the "adequate
standards" limitation is not dependent on the action or inaction of the state
legislature. It is a limitation which survives the "clean slate" interpreta-
tion of section 9 of the transition schedule of the 1970 Constitution be-
136. Id. at 569, 284 N.E.2d at 257; 42 1ll.2d at 506, 250 N.E.2d at 132; both
cases quoting from Hill v. Relyea, 34 111. 2d 552; 555, 216 N.E.2d 795, 797 (1966).
137. Randolph v. School Unit 201, 132 II1. App. 2d 936, 938, 270 N.E.2d 50,
52 (3d Dist. 1971). .
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cause it does not arise by a pre-existing statute. Given the courts' sense
of obligation toward protecting the public interest with regard to negotiated
teacher agreements, it would seem that they have chosen the wrong legal
theory in providing that protection. Even if the Dillon's Rule limita-
tion could provide a balancing of the public interest against the rights of
teachers, it would seem that it is vulnerable to attacks from the 1970 Con-
stitution.
Gregory N. Freerksen
